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The relevance of direct supply-side e®ects of monetary policy in a New Keynesian
DSGE model is studied. We extend a model with several nominal and real frictions by
introducing a cost channel of monetary transmission and allowing for non-separability
of money and consumption in the utility of the representative household. These fea-
tures have important theoretical consequences for the output-in°ation trade-o® and
indeterminacy of interest rate rules. The empirical evidence for these e®ects are then
examined using a Bayesian maximum likelihood framework complemented with GMM
single-equation estimation. Both estimation strategies point to weak evidence for the
cost channel and non-separable utility.
JEL Classification: E42, E52, C11.
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What are the consequences of direct supply-side e®ects of monetary policy? Are they
empirically signi¯cant? Do these outweigh the usual demand-side e®ects? This paper ad-
dresses these questions in two ways. First, we develop a model, in the now standard New
Keynesian tradition, by incorporating a cost channel of monetary transmission and al-
lowing for non-separability of money and consumption in the utility of the representative
household. We derive two important results. If non-separability holds (more precisely,
if consumption and money are complements), the cost channel e®ects are signi¯cantly
ampli¯ed, resulting in a transmission mechanism that generates a considerable negative
in°ation-output trade-o®. Furthermore, when these two features are present, interest rate
rules may become unstable and indeterminate, with supply-side e®ects counteracting the
stabilization e®ects of the demand channel. Second, we assess the empirical relevance of
these supply-side e®ects. Using US data, we consider evidence from both GMM single-
equation estimation and Bayesian system estimation of fully-°edged New Keynesian dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (NK-DSGE) models, featuring a variety of nominal
and real frictions. Both estimation methods point to weak evidence for the cost channel
and non-separable utility.
The issues addressed in this paper are of substantial importance for policy purposes.
While a new breed of NK-DSGE models has enjoyed considerable success in explaining
and forecasting the observed properties of macroeconomic time series, recent contributions
emphasize the importance of supply-side channels for the transmission of monetary policy.
One strand has paid attention to the so-called `cost channel', in which nominal interest
rate °uctuations a®ect the cost of ¯nancing working capital, impacting on ¯rms' marginal
cost and pricing decisions. This can cause in°ation and nominal interest rates to move in
the same direction after a monetary policy shock, giving rise to a \price puzzle". Barth
and Ramey (2001), using industry-level US data, ¯nd support for such a channel, while
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005, CEE henceforth) ¯nd that the presence of
full cost channel is crucial to their empirical results, obtained by VAR-based minimum
distance methods: indeed, CEE ¯nd that the absence of such an assumption generates
price duration estimates which are not empirically plausible. In addition, Ravenna and
Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and Schabert (2006) obtain signi¯cant results
via GMM estimation of New Keynesian Phillips curves augmented with a cost channel
parameter. They estimate an interest rate elasticity larger than one, although their results
depend on the set of instruments and on the normalization of the moment conditions. By
contrast, Rabanal (2007), estimating using Bayesian methods a smaller-scale model than
2ours, ¯nds the cost channel e®ect to be quantitatively very small.
A di®erent e®ect arises if money is assumed to yield utility, for example, through
reducing transaction costs. This opens up further channels through which money can
a®ect the output and in°ation dynamics. Nelson (2002), for example, explores ways in
which base money is a signi¯cant determinant of aggregate demand. Ireland (2004) and
Andr¶ es and Vall¶ es (2006), on the other hand, specify small-scale DSGE models for the US
and the Euro area, respectively, in which real balances are allowed to a®ect the IS curve,
unlike traditional models: however, maximum likelihood estimates suggest that money
has a limited role in explaining business cycle °uctuations.
Our study introduces important novelties and contributes to the literature in several
distinct ways. First, by bringing together non-separable utility and cost channel e®ects
into a uni¯ed model, we are able to uncover non-negligible joint mechanisms through which
monetary policy is transmitted. Second, we help to clarify contradictory results that have
emerged in the literature concerning the empirical importance of these supply-side e®ects.
Signi¯cantly, our two-pronged empirical strategy shows that ¯ndings from di®erent esti-
mation methods are broadly consistent with each other. In particular, once we adopt a
more appropriate GMM estimator, the contradiction in the results reported in the litera-
ture concerning the importance of the cost channel virtually disappears. Third, our setup
o®ers an alternative way of analysing and testing for the role of money in business cycle
dynamics. Interestingly, our framework bypasses the need to observe and measure real
money balances (always a controversial task), as its e®ects can be derived from the non-
separable utility speci¯cation. This contrasts with the previous work of Ireland (2004)
and Andr¶ es and Vall¶ es (2006). Fourth, unlike previous papers1, prior information con-
cerning the model parameters is introduced by employing Bayesian maximum likelihood
estimation. This is computationally advantageous since parameter space is restricted to
economically meaningful regions. Also, the Bayesian methods employed here utilize of
all the cross-equation restrictions implied by the general equilibrium set-up, which makes
estimation more e±cient when compared to the partial equilibrium approaches of Ravenna
and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and Schabert (2006). Even when single-
equation estimation is employed, we make use of a preferable GMM estimator that depends
neither on the normalization of the moment conditions, nor on the choice of the lags of the
optimal weighting matrix. Finally, by estimating a reference NK-DSGE model based on
CEE and Smets and Wouters (2003 and 2007, SW hereafter), which includes capital and
makes use of seven observables and structural shocks, our analysis o®ers a more complete
1Rabanal (2007) also uses Bayesian methods, but he con¯nes his analysis to the cost channel in smaller-
scale, more incomplete model than ours. This paper came to our attention after our main results were
obtained. The 2003 working paper version did not, for example, include capital.
3description of the economy than most of the papers cited above. We then compare the
baseline NK-DSGE model (Model 1) to a second model with a non-separable utility spec-
i¯cation (Model 2), a model with an added cost channel (Model 3) and, ¯nally, a more
comprehensive model which incorporates both e®ects (Model 4).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a basic theoretical model which
sets out the behavioural equations for households and ¯rms with the corresponding model
steady state model solutions. As mentioned, two innovations we introduce are the inclusion
of a cost channel µ a la Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and non-separable utility in consumption
and money as in Felices and Tuesta (2006). The theoretical implications of these e®ects
are analysed in section 3. We then turn to parameter estimation, ¯rst by GMM (section
4), and then Bayesian estimation (section 5), where a linearized benchmark NK-DSGE
model is extended by incorporating a cost channel and non-separable utility. Section 6
provides a ¯nal discussion.
2 The Basic Model
This section presents a New Keynesian model describing output and in°ation dynam-
ics, and incorporates a variety of nominal and real frictions. We study potential direct
supply-side e®ects by allowing for non-separable utility in consumption decisions and by
introducing a \cost channel" through which nominal interest rate °uctuations a®ect pric-
ing decisions.
2.1 Households
The consumer i maximizes the following non-separable utility in consumption Ct(i) and
real money balances
Mt(i)















where UC;t is a preference shock common to all households,
(©t(i))
µ¡1
µ = b(Ct(i) ¡ hCt¡1)
µ¡1







4and hCt¡1 represents external habit in consumption, subject to the usual budget constraint







where Wt(i) is the labour type i and Wt =
R 1
0 Wt(i)1¡´di is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate wage
index. This leads to standard ¯rst-order conditions:
MUM
























where rt is the nominal interest rate and the marginal utilities of consumption, real money
balances and labour supply are given respectively by
MUC
t (i) = bUC;t(©t(i))
1
µ¡¾(Ct(i) ¡ hCt¡1)¡ 1
µ
MUM
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Assuming complete markets, individual and aggregate consumption can be equated to
5give





































To assess the empirical relevance of this e®ect, we can use estimates of ¾ and µ to draw
conclusions on the substitutability or complementarity of money balances and consump-
tion. The elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption with respect to real money
balances can be shown to have the same sign as 1 ¡ ¾µ. Therefore consumption and real
balances are complements (as we expect) i® ¾µ < 1.
2.2 Firms
Aggregate output in the competitive ¯nal goods sector which use a continuum of interme-







where Yt(j) is the output of intermediate ¯rm j producing variety j and ³ is the elasticity
of substitution. Let Pt(j) be the price of input f: Minimizing the cost
R 1
0 Pt(j)Yt(j)dj











1¡³ is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate price index. Since the ¯nal
good ¯rms are competitive and the only inputs are intermediate goods, it is also the
domestic price level.
In the intermediate goods sector, each good j is produced by a single ¯rm with inputs
consisting only of di®erentiated labour, using a technology





6where Lt(j) is an aggregate Dixit-Stiglitz index of di®erentiated labour types used by the
¯rm and Lt(i;j) is the labour input of type i by ¯rm j. The term At is total factor produc-
tivity that is common to all ¯rms. The ¯rm minimizes the wage costs
R 1
0 Wt(i)Lt(i;j)di
of producing output Yt(j) with respect to Ã Lt(i;j) leading to the demand for labour in (3).
In an equilibrium of identical households and ¯rms, all wages adjust to the same level and




where we assume that ¯rms must borrow to pay wages at the beginning of the period (the
`cost channel').
Turning to price-setting, ¯rms reset prices in any given period with probability 1 ¡ ».
Thus the optimal price P0
t for any ¯rm that sets its price at t must take into account the
downward-sloping demand curve, (7). The ¯rst-order condition for pro¯t-maximization




























The ¯rst-order condition (8) is cumbersome to manipulate. However, it is possible
to express this price-setting rule in terms of di®erence equations that are far easier to












t and in addition noting that Pt+k=Pt =
¦t+k:::¦t+1, the ¯rms' staggered price setting can be succinctly described by
Qt = ¤t=Ht






















including the cost channel in the cost of labour.
Assuming that the number of ¯rms is large, we can use the law of large numbers to





t¡1 + (1 ¡ »)Q
1¡³
t
and hence aggregate in°ation is given by
1 = »¦
³¡1
t + (1 ¡ »)Q
1¡³
t (9)
It is easy to show that if there is planned indexation to the overall price index as well,
i.e. the future price at time t+k is given by P0
t (Pt+k¡1=Pt)°, then all the results presented




The impact of price dispersion arises from labour input being the same for each individual,

























Pt )¡³dj ¸ 1. Equality is reached only when prices
are °exible and therefore the same, as all ¯rms are identical except in their timing of price





which clearly highlights the output distortion caused by price dispersion ¢t ¸ 1.
Price dispersion is linked to in°ation as follows. Assuming, as before, that the number
8of ¯rms is large, we obtain the following dynamic relationship:
¢t = »¦
³
t¢t¡1 + (1 ¡ »)Q
¡³
t
Using (9) we then obtain the dynamic equation
¢t = »¦
³










In equilibrium, goods and the bond markets all clear. Equating supply with demand of




= Ct + Gt
where Gt is government spending on goods and services that are part of aggregate output.
The model is Ricardian: Gt is ¯nanced out of lump-sum taxation, so the evolution of
government debt is irrelevant. By Walras' law, the bond market equilibrium conditions
can be dispensed with. This completes the model given the interest rate which takes the
form of interest rate commitment rules discussed later.
3 Implications of Direct Interest Rate Effects
The existence of a cost channel and non-separability of utility has important consequences
for the output-in°ation trade-o® which in turn impacts on the optimal in°ation path for
the Ramsey planner. There are also implications for the determinacy of interest rate rules.
This section examines these issues. In this analysis, we con¯ne ourselves to a simpler model
with no habit in consumption (h = 0).
93.1 The Long-Term Output-Inflation Trade-Off and Ramsey Infla-
tion Rate
Given the gross in°ation rate ¦, from the steady state of the model set out in Appendix
































Equations (10) to (12) describe the output-in°ation steady-state relationship. We are
now in a position to ask a pertinent question: is there a long-run positive or negative
in°ation-output trade-o® and how is it a®ected by the cost-channel and non-separable
utility e®ects?
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We refer to the ¯rst term in (13) as a `sticky price e®ect' because it disappears as prices
become °exible and » ! 0. For ¦ À 1 the term in (1¡¦) is negative, but for low in°ation,
where ¦ is close to unity, it approaches zero. This leaves a slightly positive output-in°ation
trade-o®, since ¯ is slightly less than unity. Thus, for the standard problem with separable
utility and no cost channel, there is only a small steady state in°ation-output trade-o®
near zero in°ation, but a negative trade-o® for high values of in°ation. This results in
the standard result that under optimal commitment (i.e., the Ramsey problem) the steady
state in°ation rate is zero.
Now consider the case of non-separable utility. If, as is usually assumed, money hold-
ings and consumption are complements, then ¾µ < 1 and the second term in (13) shows
that the non-separable utility e®ect adds to the negative output-in°ation trade-o®. The
10intuition here is quite simple: an increase in in°ation increases the nominal interest rate
and holdings of money fall. Since consumption and money balances are complements,
consumption falls with a shift into leisure. Thus, work e®ort falls and with it output. This
larger negative output-in°ation trade-o® leads to another standard result (see, for exam-
ple, Woodford (2003), chapter 4): the steady state Ramsey net in°ation rate is negative
if ¾µ < 1 (the case where money balances and consumption are complements) and lies in
the interval [¯ ¡ 1;0] where the lower bound corresponds to R = 0 (Friedman rule).
Finally, the last term in (13) shows that adding the cost channel results in high in°ation
reducing the natural rate of output still further, because it increases marginal costs. This
then pushes the steady state Ramsey net in°ation rate close to the Friedman rule of ¯¡1.
3.2 Implications for the Stability and Determinacy of Interest Rate
Rules
With h = 0 and suppressing shocks to government spending, the stability and determinacy
of the linearized model depends on the following Euler equation and Phillips Curve
EtmuC
t+1 = muC
t ¡ (rt ¡ Et¼t+1) (14)
¯Et¼t+1 = ¼t + °muC











and ®c 2 [0;1] is the degree of forward ¯nancing of the wage bill. The crucial parameter
±n is de¯ned by
















With money balances and consumption assumed to be complements, ¾µ < 1, ±n < 0 and
the cost channel and non-separable utility e®ects of an interest rate rise work together to
11increase marginal costs.
We examine a pure current in°ation targeting interest-rate rule of the form
rt = ½rt¡1 + µ¼¼t ; ½ 2 [0;1]; µ¼ > 0 (19)
Equations (14), (15) and (19) describes the dynamics of our model economy. By an ap-
propriate rede¯nition of the parameters ° and · it also describes a model of a small open
partially dollarized economy studied in Batini, Levine, and Pearlman (2008). Then using
the root-locus techniques set out in Batini, Justiniano, Levine, and Pearlman (2006), the
former of these papers proves the following result:
Proposition
In the system (14), (15) and (19):
(a) If (1 ¡ ½)· > ° there is either indeterminacy or instability.
(b) If 2· > ° > (1 ¡ ½)·, then the system is stable and determinate for some range
1 < µ¼ < ¹ µ¼.
(c) If ° > 2·, then any feedback µ¼ > 1 from current in°ation leads to stability and
determinacy.
Thus, the combined presence of a full cost channel e®ect ®c = 1 and the complemen-
tarity of money and consumption (±n < 0) can lead to instability or indeterminacy. The
intuition behind this result is that with · > 0, which holds if money and consumption
are complements, supply and demand e®ects of nominal interest rate changes operate in
opposite directions, with the former undermining the stabilization e®ects of the latter.
However, in the absence of both a cost channel and non-separable utility e®ect, case (c)
holds and any current interest rate rule results in stability and determinacy. Also, inter-
est rate smoothing (a high ½) helps to induce determinacy, a result obtained in Batini,
Justiniano, Levine, and Pearlman (2006) for both current and forward-looking in°ation
targeting rules.
4 GMM Estimation
As an empirical counterpoint to our subsequent system Bayesian estimations, we obtain
estimates of sections of the above model, which have previously been discussed in a single-
equation setting. The main focus is the estimation of a NKPC with cost channel. We
then brie°y look at GMM estimation of the consumption Euler equation.
124.1 Estimation of the NKPC
Regarding the NKPC with an added cost channel, we reassess the empirical evidence
produced by Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and Schabert (2006).
Using standard GMM procedures, these authors found some evidence of a direct e®ect of
°uctuations in the nominal interest rate on the dynamics of in°ation. However, there are
reasons to question the validity of these ¯ndings. First, it is well known that the usual
two-step GMM estimator has poor ¯nite sample properties.2 On the other hand, the
estimators used in the above mentioned papers are not invariant to transformations of the
moment conditions, which means that the results depend on the normalization adopted
for the estimation.
We address these issues by resorting to the continuous-updating (CU) GMM procedure
of Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996). This estimator is, in principle, preferable, given its
higher order e±ciency and superior small sample properties when compared to a standard,
often biased, GMM estimator (see Newey and Smith (2004) and Anatolyev (2005)). Also,
it does not depend on the normalization adopted for the moment conditions. This will
allow us to focus on the economic speci¯cations, rather than on their econometric imple-
mentation. Moreover, since there is no a priori reason to choose a particular bandwidth
for the GMM optimal weighting matrix, we compute this matrix using the data-dependent
method proposed by Andrews (1991).
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) estimate a forward-looking NKPC with real marginal cost
as the driving variable for in°ation dynamics3, as suggested by Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999)
and Sbordone (2002). In the basic model without capital, real marginal cost is given by
MCt = WtLt=PtYt. If we add a cost channel e®ect, the real marginal cost (proportional
deviations from the steady state in lower case letters) is mct = ®crt + st, where st is the
share of labour.
From (B.15), we can then write the forward-looking NKPC, in log-linear form about







¼t¡1 + ¸(®crt + st) + &t (20)
where
¸ ´
(1 ¡ ¯»)(1 ¡ »)
(1 + ¯°)»
(21)
which requires augmenting the model with a disturbance term &t (capturing expectational
2See Newey and Smith (2004), Anatolyev (2005) and the special issue of the Journal of Business
Economics and Statistics (1996, vol. 14).
3Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and Schabert (2006) extend the speci¯cation to the hybrid version of the
NKPC, incorporating a lagged in°ation term.
13or measurement errors, for example), which should be orthogonal to the agents' informa-







¼t¡1 ¡ ¸(®crt + st)]gzt = 0; (22)
where zt is a vector of variables orthogonal to &t; which will typically contain past obser-
vations of the variables in (20), but may also include other variables which are judged to
contain information orthogonal to &t. We can then estimate (20) by GMM using data for
¼t, st and rt; as well as instruments in zt: The in°ation rate is measured as GDP de°ator
in°ation, marginal cost is proxied by non-farm business sector real unit labour costs and
interest is the 3-month T-bill rate. Instruments include four lags of: ¼t;st;rt, the CRB
commodity price index in°ation, wage in°ation, the term spread and HP-¯ltered output
gap, as in Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
Table 1 presents results for the estimation of (20), using quarterly data for the period
1960:1-2004:4. We estimate the NKPC with and without indexation. Moreover, we also
present estimates assuming ¯ = 0:99; a value commonly used and close to the implicit
¯ in our sample. The CU-GMM is computed using a weighting matrix with the sample
moments in mean deviation form and an automated lag-length selection procedure as in
Andrews (1991), employing the Bartlett kernel. This avoids an arbitrary choice for the
truncation lag.
Unlike Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and Schabert (2006),
we found no substantial evidence of a cost channel e®ect, as the estimates of ®c are always
insigni¯cant. While it is true that t-tests or Wald tests of the hypothesis that ®c = 1 are
not rejected, this is due to the large standard error associated with the estimates of ®c:
In addition, our estimates of ®c are substantially lower than those presented in Ravenna
and Walsh (2006) and, therefore, distant from the benchmark value of ®c = 1: The other
parameters are estimated much more precisely and their values are consistent with results
reported elsewhere: estimates of ¯ range4 between 0.96 and 1.01, while the coe±cient for
Calvo prices »P lies in the interval (0:82;0:92): These values appear to be more sensible
that those reported in Ravenna and Walsh (2006). If one allows for indexation, estimates
of the backward-looking component ° range between 0.39 and 0.47.
The reported di®erences cannot be attributed to the use of a di®erent sample period.
When we restrict the sample size to be the same as in Ravenna and Walsh (2006) (1960
to 2001), results5 are not qualitatively di®erent from those in Table 1. We also estimated
4The parameter space was not constrained in the estimation. Tests for the hypothesis that ¯ < 1 are
never rejected.
5Even when using the same dataset of Ravenna and Walsh (2006), it was not possible to reproduce
14the NKPC with the sample starting in 1980, as in Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and Schabert
(2006) and thus excluding the two oil shocks, but no signi¯cant di®erences emerge.6
In order to avoid potential weak identi¯cation problems, Ravenna and Walsh (2006)
suggest using a smaller set of instruments (instrument set B), which considers the ¯rst two
lags of the variables in the instrument set A, with the exception of the in°ation rate and
the interest rate, with four lags. The bottom half of Table 1 presents estimates using the
smaller set and we can observe that the `B' estimates are very similar to those obtained
employing the larger instrument set.
We further account for the possibility of weak identi¯cation by computing the identi¯cation-
robust statistics of Kleibergen (2005), who proposed a set of inference procedures that are
valid regardless of whether the parameters are strongly or weakly identi¯ed. One can
obtain a con¯dence set for values µ0 of a generic set of parameters µ for which the null hy-
pothesis H0 : µ = µ0 is not rejected using Kleibergen's K statistic. This statistic is based
on a quadratic form in the ¯rst-order conditions of the CUE, and has a Â2(p) limiting
distribution that depends only on the number of parameters p.
The K statistic may be appropriately transformed if one wishes to test a sub-vector of
µ, for instance if one or more parameters are deemed to be strongly identi¯ed. Focusing
on the forward-looking speci¯cation, and from the results discussed above, it is relatively
safe to assume that the parameters ¯ and »P are well identi¯ed. Thus, we can concentrate
our attention on the main parameter of interest and conduct tests for H0 : ®c = ®0
c, using
subset tests: Speci¯cally, we perform a grid search over the parameter space of ®7, we
test H0 : ®c = ®0
c and collect the values ®0
c for which the p-value exceeds a joint 5%
signi¯cance level.8 To save space, we report results9 when f¯;»Pg is ¯xed at f0:99;0:85g:
Figure 1 plots the sequence of the Kleibergen K¤ statistic for the grid of values ®0
c.
We can observe that the region for which the null H0 : ®c = ®0
c is not rejected is formed
by, approximately, the interval (¡0:15;0:9): Two important points should hence be noted.
First, while the interval contains economically relevant values for ®c; it also includes the
case of no cost channel. Second, it unambiguously excludes both the baseline case of
®c = 1 and the estimated values reported by Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury,
their ¯ndings.
6Results not reported are available upon request.
7We choose the interval (¡0:5;2), with increments of 0:01; thus including values close to 0 (no cost
channel) and values larger than 1, consistent with estimates presented in Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and
Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and Schabert (2006).
8We follow the suggestion of Kleibergen (2005) by combining his K statistic with the asymptotically
independent J(µ) statistic for overidentifying restrictions. For the combined J-K test, denoted K
¤, we use
a signi¯cance level of 1% for the J-test and 4% for the K-test, therefore emphasizing simple parameter
hypothesis testing, see paper for details.
9Results do not change qualitatively if we choose other economically relevant values for ¯ and »P, or
when CU-GMM estimates are used instead.
15Ho®mann, and Schabert (2006) of around 1.2-1.3.
Thus by using an estimation procedure that is not sensitive to the speci¯cation of
the orthogonality conditions and is, in theory, more e±cient that those used in Ravenna
and Walsh (2006), we conclude that there is no substantial evidence of a cost channel.
Furthermore, even when we allow for weak identi¯cation, our evidence is not consistent
with the results of Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and Schabert
(2006) and therefore one cannot safely reject that there is no direct interest rate e®ect on
in°ation.
4.2 Estimation of the Euler Equation
The same approach can be used estimate the separable utility parameter ±n by single-












((1 ¡ ±n)rt ¡ Et¼t+1 + EtuC;t+1 ¡ uC;t)
Since we do not observe preference shocks in the GMM estimation, we must leave these
out in (23).
As in the previous section, we can re-write (23) in terms of orthogonality conditions.
For instruments we use four lags of the observables in (23), in addition to four lags of output
growth and the interest rate spread. Preliminary joint estimation of the parameters h,
¾ and ±n was disappointing, in that convergence proved hard to achieve and numerical
estimates lacked economic meaning. This may be due to identi¯cation problems or the
existence of several local minima.
We chose to calibrate the utility parameter and then obtain estimates of h and ±n.
Table 2 shows results for this estimation strategy, for ¾ = f1;1:5;2;2:5g: We observe that
±n is never statistically signi¯cant, thus implying that the marginal utility of consumption
is found to be una®ected by changes in real money balances changes. On the other hand,
estimates of the habit parameter estimates are broadly in line with values found previously
in the literature, though perhaps exhibit a little too much persistent (namely for ¾ = 2:5):
10An alternative strategy would be the direct estimation of the non-linear Euler equation (6), plus (7)
and (7), obtaining estimates for h, b, ¾ and µ. We could also estimate (7), which in linearized form becomes






1¡¯it, in a two-equation estimation with (23).
165 Bayesian Estimation
We now turn to the estimation of the whole system using Bayesian methods, and compare
variants of the model with and without a cost channel and non-separable utility e®ect. In
short, Bayesian maximum likelihood estimation enables us to estimate the same parame-
ters as GMM, but in a system framework. We extend the basic model discussed in section
2, and linearized in Appendix B, by introducing further rigidities and frictions, following
the in°uential papers of CEE and Smets and Wouters (2003). In particular, we add wage
stickiness, adjustment costs in capital accumulation, variable capital utilization, and close
the model with an `empirical' Taylor-type rule (C.49). The model is then estimated us-
ing seven macroeconomic series as observable variables, augmented with seven orthogonal
structural shocks capturing changes in technology and preferences, cost-push factors, and
policy shocks. With these additions, our benchmark model - without a cost channel and
with separable utility - is similar to the SW model (Smets and Wouters (2003)), thus al-
lowing us to conduct relevant empirical comparisons. The model in log-linear form about
the deterministic zero-in°ation steady state is given in Appendix C.
5.1 Bayesian Methods and Priors
Bayesian estimation entails obtaining the posterior distribution of the model's parameters






where p(µ) denotes the prior density of the parameter vector µ, L(µ=Y T) is the like-
lihood of the sample Y T with T observations (evaluated with the Kalman ¯lter) and
R
L(µ=Y T)p(µ) corresponds to the marginal likelihood. Since there is no closed form ana-
lytical expression for the posterior, this must be simulated11. One of the main advantages
of adopting a Bayesian approach is that it facilitates a formal comparison of di®erent
models through their posterior marginal likelihoods, computed using the Geweke (1999)
modi¯ed harmonic-mean estimator. If the prior probability of each competing model is
assigned equal weight, then the posterior odds ratio (or Bayes Factor, see Kass and Raftery
11200,000 random draws (though the ¯rst 30% "burn-in" observations are discarded) from the posterior
density were obtained via the MCMC-Metropolis Hastings algorithm (MH), with the variance-covariance
matrix of the perturbation term in the algorithm being adjusted in order to obtain reasonable acceptance
rates (between 20%-40%), see Schorfheide (2000) for more details.










where P(M=D) represents the posterior model probabilities given data, while P(D=M) is
the marginal data density. The speci¯cation which attains the highest odds outperforms
its rivals and is therefore favoured.
In order to implement Bayesian estimation, it is ¯rst necessary to de¯ne prior distri-
butions for the parameters. We keep seven of the structural parameters are ¯xed in the
estimation procedure. As suggested by Adolfson (2007), these parameters can often be
related to the steady state values of the observed variables in the model and are, therefore,
calibrated so as to match their sample mean. Thus, the discount factor ¯ is set to 0.99,
which implies an annual steady state nominal interest rate of 4 percent. The depreciation
rate ± is set to 0.025, which implies an annual depreciation rate of 10% on capital. Accord-
ing to previous studies for the US economy, we assume the following implied steady state
relationships: the consumption-output ratio cy is 0.56, the government spending-output
ratio gy is 0.20 and the investment-output ratio iy is 0.24. The labour share in production
® is ¯xed to 0.36, which is a conventional value for the US and ¯nally the wage mark-
up parameter ¸w is set to 0.20 in all models, as this parameter12 is not identi¯ed. For
the remainder of parameters inverse gamma distributions are used as priors when non-
negativity constraints are necessary, and beta distributions for fractions or probabilities.
Normal distributions are used when more informative priors seem to be necessary.
The prior means and distributions of these parameters can be found in Table 4 and
all priors are assumed to be the same across speci¯cations. A common theme in papers
estimating DSGE models is the di±culty in pinning down the parameter of labour supply
elasticity Á, as inference on the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply has been found
susceptible to model speci¯cations, exhibiting wide posterior probability intervals (see
Batini, Justiniano, Levine, and Pearlman (2006)). As a result, based on the values assumed
in the real business cycle literature, we assume a normal distribution with mean 1.2 and
standard deviation of 0.5 for the parameter Á. Following previous studies conducted for
both closed and open economies, notably Smets and Wouters (2005), Smets and Wouters
(2007) and Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005), we use a beta distribution for
the habit, price indexation and wage indexation parameters and set the means to 0.5 and
standard deviations to 0.15 for the indexation parameters and 0.2 for habit. Similarly,
the risk aversion parameter ¾ is assumed normally distributed and centered at 2.0 with
12¸w enters into the wage setting equation, where ´ =
1+¸w
¸w .
18a standard deviation of 0.5. The Calvo coe±cients »W and »P are assumed to be beta
distributed with prior means of 0.5 and prior standard deviations of 0.2, implying that
prices and wages are sticky for two quarters, given that the quarterly discount factor is
calibrated to 0.99. For the degree of cost channel ®C we use an intermediate value 0.5
as the mean and a beta distribution with standard deviation equal to 0.2. Finally, the
prior means for the other parameters, including the coe±cients of the interest rate rule,
the AR(1) shocks and their standard deviations are chosen in line with those in Smets
and Wouters (2005) and Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005). Next, a more
detailed discussion is provided concerning the choice of prior for the non-separable utility
parameter.
5.2 Choice of Prior for ±n
According to our model, this parameter is obtained from (16) - (18), and implies we
cannot identify both b and µ as yet. However, we now show how observed data for real
money balances as a proportion of consumption and estimates of the elasticity of the
marginal utility of consumption with respect to total money balances (ª, say) can be
used to calibrate the preference parameters b and µ in (16)-(18). Consider the utility of











plus a term in labour supply (26)
where Mr ´ M









Now let cz ´
C(1¡h)
Mr be the `e®ective-consumption'{real money balance ratio (allowing for
external habit). Then di®erentiating (26), the elasticity the marginal utility of consump-









µ + 1 ¡ b)
(28)
where we de¯ne range of plausible values of 13 ª 2 [0;0:02]. Since ª > 0 we impose on
our calibration the property that money and consumption are complements.
From the ¯rst-order conditions of the household in the zero-in°ation steady state we






1 = ¯(1 + R) (30)




µ = (1 ¡ ¯) (31)
Thus, given ¾, ¯, h, cz and ª, equations (27){(31) can be solved for b and µ. Figure





0:25 where my are money balances as a proportion of quarterly GDP. For
© 2 [0:0:02] we ¯nd a range ¡±n 2 [0;0:5]. Our prior, ±n = ¡0:25 lies at the mid-point of
this range.
5.3 Posterior Estimates and Model Comparison
To estimate the system we use seven macro-economic observables at quarterly frequency:
real GDP, real consumption, real investment, the GDP de°ator, real wages, employment
and the nominal interest rate. Since the variables in the model are measured as deviations
from a constant steady state, the time series are simply detrended against a linear trend.
The estimation results are based on a sample from 1970:1 to 2004:4 and 39 observations are
used to initialize the Kalman recursion. The following four model variants were estimated:
1. benchmark (SW) model: (±n = ®c = 0)
2. ±n < 0, ®c = 0.
3. ®c 2 (0;1], ±n = 0.
4. ®c 2 (0;1], ±n < 0.
Table 5 reports the parameter estimates using the Bayesian methods described above.
It summarizes posterior means of the studied parameters and 90% con¯dence intervals for
the four speci¯cations, as well as the posterior model odds. Overall, parameter estimates
are plausible and reasonably robust across speci¯cations. The results are generally similar
to those of Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005) for the US.
The estimation results of Model 3 and Model 4 show that the degree of cost channel,
®c, is somewhat higher when the model also assumes that money and consumption in
the household's utility is non-separable. However, we also note that the 90% con¯dence
20intervals do not include the baseline case of ®c = 1 and are much smaller than the estimates
of ®c reported in Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and Schabert
(2006). Also, note that unlike CEE, whether or not ®c is included in the model has no
e®ect on the magnitude of wage and price stickiness parameters (and therefore contract
and price durations): recall that CEE justi¯ed the inclusion of a cost channel on the
grounds that without it, estimated durations were implausibly long.
The last row of Table 5 reports the posterior model odds, revealing that Model 3
(with only the cost channel e®ect) slightly outperforms its three rivals with a posterior
probability of 35%. This suggests that incorporating a cost channel seems to o®er some
improvements in terms of the model ¯tness to the data in the US economy. On the other
hand, Model 2 (with only the non-separable utility e®ect) ¯nds little support. However,
the di®erences in log marginal likelihoods or the posterior odds ratio are not substantive.
For example, the log marginal likelihood di®erence between Model 3 and Model 2 is 0.68.
As suggested by Kass and Raftery (1995), in order to choose Model 3 over Model 2, we need
a prior probability over Model 3 1:97(= e0:68) times larger than our prior probability over
Model 2. This factor is believed to be small and therefore we are unable to conclude that
Model 3 outperforms Model 2. Equivalently, in a Bayesian model comparison expressed in
(25), a posterior Bayes factor B needs to be at least 3 for there to be a positive evidence
favouring Model Mj. As a result, we cannot ¯nd substantial evidence that the addition
of a cost channel improves the ability of the benchmark model to explain US data.
Figure 3 plots the prior and posterior distributions for the `best' model (Model 3).
The location and the shape of the posterior distributions are largely independent of the
priors we have selected since priors are broadly less informative. Most of the posterior
distributions seem to be roughly symmetric implying that the mean and median coincide.
According to Figure 3, there is little information in the data for some parameters where
prior and posterior overlap. Notably, this is true for parameters sd("¼t) and ®c. This is
in accordance with the results in section 4.1, for GMM estimation of the cost channel.
For completeness we also present the posteriors and priors for Model 4 (Figure 4).
We note that in all instances, posteriors bear considerable similarities to those in Model
3. This is not surprising given the reported results in Table 5. We also ¯nd it useful to
compare the degree of cost channel in both models (Figure 5). While posteriors suggest
that there is some information in the data to inform our estimates of ®c (i.e., curves do
not overlap each other), pro¯les do remain close to the priors. Indeed, the posteriors for
both models are almost identical.
215.4 Robustness checks
In order to verify the robustness of the results discussed above, we conduct a series of
experiments on some variants of our model. Initially, we carry out an informal check
on the inherent identi¯ability of Model 4's structure by running a series of Monte Carlo
simulations. We generate 1000 arti¯cial datasets for all the observable variables, each
sample being initialised with di®erent sample values from the variables. We simulate
the data by imposing the prior means to the parameters for all the iterations. We then
re-estimate Model 4 using the arti¯cial datasets with T = 200 and check whether the
means and standard deviations of the ML estimates recover the DSGE model's priors14.
The simulation and estimation results are then compared with the prior distributions and
reported in Table 4. The results show that a number of deep parameters seem to have
di±culties to get back to the parameter prior values. The problematic parameters that
exhibit relatively larger biases compared to the other structural parameters (percentage
deviations = 10%) are highlighted in Table 4. Signi¯cantly, ®c is among this group,
suggesting that there is some di±culty in recovering this parameter using our fully-°edged
DSGE model.
Additionally, we experimented with di®erent priors for the cost channel and separable
utility parameters, and variants of the models were re-estimated. Our complete ¯ndings
are reported in Gabriel, Levine, Spencer, and Yang (2008), and the remainder of this
section restricts itself to key results. Model 3 was re-estimated we using a `di®use' prior
for ®c based on a uniform (0;1) distribution, similar to Rabanal (2007). We ¯nd that
the posteriors are sensitive to this change, as the new estimate of ®c becomes 0 and the
log marginal likelihood deteriorates signi¯cantly (¡556:38). When imposing ®c = 1 in
Model 3 as in CEE, we ¯nd indeterminacy, as predicted in section 3 and hence we were
unable to obtain any parameter estimates for this case. Imposing ®c = 0:8 eventually
yields determinacy of the equilibrium of the modi¯ed Model 3, but the model's marginal
likelihood of ¡476:83 suggests that it fails to compete with all previous models. It appears
that calibrating the model with higher degrees of cost channel leads to indeterminacy for
all parameter values in our system or worsens the ¯t of the model. Further, a comparison of
the estimated posterior impulse response functions of Model 3 (cost channel) and Model 1
(benchmark SW) reveals that adding a cost channel leads to very little di®erences between
Model 3 and model 1: here, we restrict our attention to the case of an interest rate
shock as shown in Figure 6.15 The IRFs generated from such a shock strengthens the
14We also tried an alternative experiment where parameter values from their prior distributions are
randomly drawn, as well as a sample of T = 1000, but results are similar (the full set of results is available
in the working paper version of this article).
15Again, see Gabriel, Levine, Spencer, and Yang (2008) for fuller details of the (very similar) impulse
22argument of there being insu±cient information in the data to support the presence of a
cost channel. We also note that our impulse responses are consistent with with those of
Rabanal (2007), who ¯nds a zero posterior probability of observing an in°ation increase
following a monetary policy shock.
Model 2 was then tested by using a `di®use` prior for ±n, based on the uniform
(¡0:5;0:5) distribution, re°ecting our uncertainty about the value of this parameter. We
¯nd that the posteriors are relatively insensitive to the change. Notably, the posterior
mean of ±n changes from ¡0:37 to ¡0:41 even if we relax the restriction that ¡±n is posi-
tive. Moreover, this model performs as well as Model 2 with the original prior, yielding a
log marginal likelihood of ¡458:56.
Alternatively, we also estimated the parameter b directly in order to derive an estimate
of ±n. Notice that ±n is de¯ned by (16). We set µ to be 0.3, while ¯ is 0.99. b is either
assumed beta distributed with prior mean of 0.5 and prior standard deviation of 0.2 or
imposed to be 1 so that the e®ect of ±n in the models is minimum. The resulting estimate
of b is 0.55 and 0.56 for models 2 (LL = ¡457:92) and 4 (LL = ¡459:62), thus implying
values of ¡0:72 and ¡0:70 for ±n, respectively. Overall, the results are consistent with our
previous ¯ndings.
6 Conclusion
Are direct supply-side e®ects of monetary policy relevant? Potentially, they are: the the-
oretical implications derived in the model identify possible non-negligible cost channel
e®ects. Empirically, however, our ¯ndings suggest this may not be the case. To recap,
we opened this paper by deriving the theoretical implications of assuming a cost channel
and non-separable utility, ¯rst for the output-in°ation trade-o®, and second, for the op-
timal in°ation path of the Ramsey planner. The determinacy of interest rate rules were
also addressed as part of this second avenue of investigation. It was within this theoreti-
cal framework that potential non-negligible cost channel e®ects were obtained. We then
tackled these issues empirically, using a two-pronged strategy of single-equation GMM
procedures and system-estimation Bayesian techniques. The results arising from both
strategies provided weak support for the presence of a cost channel for monetary policy.
While Bayesian estimation favours a model with the cost channel, the improvements in
model ¯t are not su±ciently compelling. Further, evidence for the non-separability of
money and consumption in the utility of the representative household is feeble. In the
Bayesian estimation, there appears to be very little information in the data about ®c and
responses generated from the other shocks listed in Table 4
23±n. We therefore suggest the two-pronged empirical strategy adopted here demonstrates
that once appropriate methods are put to use, previous contradictions in the literature
seem to vanish.
Note, however, that we do not claim these supply side e®ects are inexistent: rather,
what we show is that for the period considered, they appear small. One possible expla-
nation for our ¯ndings is that any such e®ects are dominated by traditional demand-side
factors. It may be the case that supply-side e®ects become more acute depending on the
phase on the business cycle, but are then averaged out when longer periods are considered.
It is also conceivable that these channels become more relevant in developing economies,
with a less stable history of in°ation and less e±cient ¯nancial markets. This, in turn,
has implications for optimal policy and for the gains from international policy coordina-
tion, see for example Coto-Martinez (2007). Thus, further investigation of these issues
represents a worthwhile endeavor.
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26A The Steady State
Given an arbitrary steady state gross in°ation rate ¦, the steady state of the model with
h = 0 takes the form16





































H(1 ¡ »¯¦³¡1) = Y MUC (A.9)






1 = »¦³¡1 + (1 ¡ »)Q1¡³ (A.11)
¢ =
(1 ¡ »)Q¡³
1 ¡ »¦³ (A.12)
giving in e®ect 13 equations in 13 endogenous variables MUM, MUC, R, W
P , MUN, L,
C, B, Y , Q, ¤, H and ¢, given ¦.
B Linearization of the Basic Model
We linearize around a zero in°ation steady state (though, as we have seen, with non-
separable utility and cost channel the Ramsey optimum is ¯ ¡ 1 < 0 = ¡0:01 in our
calibration). All variables are expressed in deviation form17 about the steady state. The
16The steady state of variable Xt is denoted by X.






where X is the baseline steady state. For
variables expressing a rate of change over time, ¼t and rt, xt = Xt ¡X. Since steady-state in°ation is zero
¼t is the actual in°ation rate, but rt = It ¡ I.
27Euler equation and NKPC are respectively:
EtmuC
t+1 = muC













(1 ¡ ¯»)(1 ¡ »)
(1 + ¯°)»
mct (B.15)
mct = ¯rt + wt ¡ pt ¡ at (B.16)




t = Ált = Á(yt ¡ at) (B.18)





(ct ¡ hct¡1) + Ált ¡ at ¡ ±nrt ¡ uC;t




(ct ¡ hct¡1) + Ált ¡ at + (¯ ¡ ±n)rt ¡ uC;t
with the cost channel. The parameter ±n is de¯ned by (16).
Given the interest rate, the linearized model is completed with
lt = yt ¡ at (B.19)




gt+1 = ½ggt + ²g;t+1 (B.21)
at+1 = ½aat + ²a;t+1 (B.22)
uC;t+1 = ½CuC;t + ²C;t (B.23)
The °exi-price output, ^ y, consistent with zero in°ation is then found by putting mct =
¼t = 0 and is then given by the system
Etd mu
C
t+1 = d mu
C
t ¡^ it (B.24)
d mu
C
t = ¡¾(^ ct ¡ h^ ct¡1) + ±n^ it + ut (B.25)
¾
(1 ¡ h)
(^ ct ¡ h^ ct¡1) = ¡Á^ lt + at ¡ (¯ ¡ ±n)^ it (B.26)
28^ l = ^ y ¡ at (B.27)
^ yt = cy^ ct + (1 ¡ cy)gt (B.28)
which de¯nes [^ i; ^ muC
t ; ^ ct; ^ lt; ^ yt], given exogenous processes [at; gt; ut].
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xt¡1 + (¯ ¡ ±n)(rt ¡^ {t)
¶
(B.29)
It is noted that the interest rate e®ects of the cost channel and the non-separable utility
enter the NKPC with the same signs - since ±n < 0 - if money and consumption are
complements, which we assume. Additionally, with h = ° = 0 (no habit nor indexation)
and cy = 1 (no government spending), (B.29) now corresponds to equation (4.8), page
421, of Woodford (2003).
C Linearization of Extended Model
In addition to the Euler equation de¯ned by (B.13) and (B.14) and the NKPC, (B.15),
we have the following:
































(1 ¡ ¯»P)(1 ¡ »P)
(1 + ¯°P)»P
mct + ²P;t (C.34)
kt = (1 ¡ ±)kt¡1 + ±it¡1 (C.35)
mct = (1 ¡ ®)(wrt + ¯®crt) +
®
RK


















(1 ¡ ¯»W)(1 ¡ »W)
(1 + ¯)»W(1 + ´Á)





t = Ált + uL;t + uC;t (C.40)
lt = kt¡1 +
1
RK
(1 + Ã)rK;t ¡ wrt (C.41)
yt = cyct + gygt + iyit + kyÃrK;t (C.42)
yt = ÁF[at + ®(
Ã
RK




uC;t+1 = ½CuC;t + ²C;t+1 (C.44)
uL;t+1 = ½LuL;t + ²L;t+1 (C.45)
uI;t+1 = ½IuI;t + ²I;t+1 (C.46)
gt+1 = ½ggt + ²g;t+1 (C.47)
at+1 = ½aat + ²a;t+1 (C.48)
where \ine±cient cost-push" shocks ²Q;t, ²P;t and ²W;t have been added to value of cap-
ital, the marginal cost and marginal rate of substitution equations, respectively, and
[²C;t;²L;t;²g;t;²a;t] are i.i.d. disturbances. Table 3 summarizes the notation.18
To implement the monetary rule we require the output gap to be the di®erence between
output for the sticky price model obtained above and output when prices and wages are
°exible, ^ yt say. Following SW, the ine±cient shocks are also eliminated from this target
level of output. The latter is obtained by setting »p = »w = ²Q;t = ²P;t = ²W;t = 0 in the
linearized model above.
The empirical Taylor rule used in the estimation is given by
rt = ½rt¡1 + (1 ¡ ½)[¹ ¼t + µ¼Et(¼t+j ¡ ¹ ¼t+j) + µyot] + µ¢¼(¼t ¡ ¼t¡1)
+ µ¢(¼t ¡ ¼t¡1) + µ¢y(ot ¡ ot¡1) (C.49)
where ot = yt ¡ ^ yt is the output gap and ¹ ¼t an exogenous in°ation target.
18Letting the shares of labour and capital be respectively, sL;t and sK;t in deviation form, with Cobb-
Douglas technology with a steady-state capital share ®, marginal costs can be written mct = ®c(1¡®)rt+
(1 ¡ ®)sL;t + ®sK;t = ®c(1 ¡ ®)rt + ¹ mct where ¹ mct is the marginal cost without the cost channel. In the
GMM estimation of the previous section, the data consists of the wage share. It follows that the ®c(1¡®)
in this section is comparable with our GMM estimates of ®c.
30D Tables of Results
Table 1: Cost-channel Phillips curve, single-equation GMM























































































Note - standard errors in brackets; #: statistically insigni¯cant estimate
31Table 2: Euler equation, GMM estimates
h ±n
















Table 3: Summary of Notation (Variables in Deviation Form)
¼t producer price in°ation over interval [t ¡ 1;t]
rt nominal interest rate over interval [t;t + 1]
wrt = wt ¡ pt real wage
mct marginal cost
mrs marginal rate of substitution between work and consumption
lt employment
zt capacity utilization
kt end-of-period t capital stock
it investment
rK;t return on capital
qt Tobin's Q
ct consumption
yt, ^ yt output with sticky prices and °exi-prices
ot = ^ yt ¡ yt output gap
ui;t+1 = ½aui;t + ²i;t+1 AR(1) processes for utility preference shocks, ui;t, i = C; L; I
at+1 = ½aat + ²a;t+1 AR(1) process for factor productivity shock, at
gt+1 = ½ggt + ²g;t+1 AR(1) process government spending shock, gt
¯ discount parameter
°p, °w indexation parameters
h habit parameter
1 ¡ »p, 1 ¡ »w probability of a price, wage re-optimization
¾ risk-aversion parameter
Á disutility of labour supply parameter
' 1
S00(1)
ÁF 1 + F
Y
± depreciation rate
® share of capital
32Table 4: Prior Distributions and ML estimation results based on Monte Carlo
realizations (Model 4)
T=200 }
Parameter notation prior mean density prior sd. mean st. err. bias? perc. dev.z
Investment adjustment S00(1) 4.00 normal 1.50 5.05 0.99 1.07 0.27
Risk aversion ¾ 2.00 normal 0.50 2.13 0.26 0.13 0.06
Domestic consumption habit hC 0.50 beta 0.20 0.47 0.20 0.03 0.06
Elasticity of disutility (labour) Á 1.20 normal 0.50 1.31 0.39 0.11 0.09
Fixed cost ÁF 1.45 normal 0.125 1.47 0.07 0.02 0.01
Capital utilisation Ã 1.00 normal 0.50 1.69 0.64 0.69 0.69
Calvo wages »W 0.50 beta 0.20 0.57 0.19 0.07 0.13
Calvo prices »P 0.50 beta 0.20 0.55 0.21 0.05 0.10
Wage indexation °W 0.50 beta 0.15 0.52 0.15 0.02 0.03
Price indexation °P 0.50 beta 0.15 0.48 0.16 0.02 0.04
Separable utility e®ect ±n -0.25 gamma 0.10 0.25 0.22 0.00 0.00
Degree of cost channel ®c 0.50 beta 0.20 0.32 0.19 0.18 0.35
Int. rate rule-in°ation gap (-1) µ¼ 2.00 normal 0.50 2.12 0.27 0.12 0.06
Int. rate rule-in°ation growth µ¢¼ 0.20 normal 0.10 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.16
Int. rate rule-output gap growth µ¢y 0.25 gamma 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.06 0.26
Int. rate rule-smoothing ½ 0.80 beta 0.10 0.80 0.10 0.00 0.00
AR(1) coef.-technology ½a 0.85 beta 0.10 0.88 0.09 0.03 0.03
AR(1) coef.-in°ation objective ½¼t 0.85 beta 0.10 0.87 0.14 0.02 0.02
AR(1) coef.-preference ½C 0.85 beta 0.10 0.85 0.11 0.00 0.00
AR(1) coef.-government ½g 0.85 beta 0.10 0.87 0.10 0.02 0.02
AR(1) coef.-labour supply ½L 0.85 beta 0.10 0.86 0.12 0.01 0.02
AR(1) coef.-investment ½I 0.85 beta 0.10 0.55 0.32 0.30 0.35
AR(1) coef.-markup shock ½P 0.50 beta 0.15 0.48 0.16 0.02 0.04
Sd.of shock sd(²a) 0.60 inv.gamma 2.00 - - - -
Sd.of shock sd(²¼t) 0.10 inv.gamma 10.0 - - - -
Sd.of shock sd(²C) 2.00 inv.gamma 2.00 - - - -
Sd.of shock sd(²g) 1.67 inv.gamma 2.00 - - - -
Sd.of shock sd(²L) 3.00 inv.gamma 2.00 - - - -
Sd.of shock sd(²I) 0.10 inv.gamma 2.00 - - - -
Sd.of shock (interest rate) sd(²r) 0.10 inv.gamma 2.00 - - - -
Sd.of shock (equity premium) sd(²Q) 5.00 inv.gamma 2.00 - - - -
Sd.of shock (price markup) sd(²P) 0.20 inv.gamma 2.00 - - - -
Sd.of shock (wage markup) sd(²W) 0.20 inv.gamma 2.00 - - - -
} We generated 1000 arti¯cial data observations of length T=200 by imposing the prior means to
all of the parameters for all the iterations. The results presented here are based on maximum
likelihood estimates for these T=200 observations.
? Note that bias is measured as the absolute value of the di®erence between the prior mean and
the mean of ML estimates for each parameter.
z We de¯ne perc. dev. as bias
priormean. `Problem' parameters (i.e., those with percentage
deviations greater than or equal to 10 percent) are highlighted in bold.
33Table 5: Bayesian Posterior Distributions
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
S00(1) 3.60 [1.96:5.01] 3.50 [1.85:5.13] 3.72 [2.07:5.28] 3.66 [1.97:5.30]
¾ 2.45 [1.91:2.99] 2.49 [1.90:3.10] 2.45 [1.91:2.99] 2.58 [2.06:3.12]
hC 0.47 [0.31:0.62] 0.50 [0.17:0.83] 0.45 [0.30:0.59] 0.50 [0.17:0.83]
Á 1.64 [0.97:2.25] 1.62 [0.99:2.25] 1.58 [0.97:2.21] 1.57 [0.93:2.17]
ÁF 1.55 [1.42:1.69] 1.54 [1.41:1.67] 1.55 [1.41:1.68] 1.54 [1.41:1.67]
Ã 2.39 [1.82:2.94] 2.39 [1.83:2.97] 2.43 [1.85:2.96] 2.40 [1.85:3.01]
»W 0.90 [0.86:0.94] 0.90 [0.87:0.94] 0.89 [0.85:0.94] 0.90 [0.86:0.94]
»P 0.79 [0.73:0.85] 0.79 [0.73:0.85] 0.79 [0.73:0.85] 0.79 [0.73:0.85]
°W 0.70 [0.55:0.87] 0.69 [0.54:0.86] 0.70 [0.55:0.87] 0.68 [0.52:0.84]
°P 0.23 [0.08:0.36] 0.23 [0.09:0.36] 0.22 [0.09:0.36] 0.23 [0.09:0.37]
®c - - 0.46 [0.20:0.73] 0.49 [0.24:0.75]
±n - -0.37 [-0.51:-0.21] - -0.35 [-0.48:-0.22]
µ¼ 2.11 [1.65:2.55] 2.02 [1.63:2.41] 2.12 [1.62:2.63] 2.08 [1.62:2.54]
µ¢¼ 0.24 [0.13:0.36] 0.23 [0.10:0.36] 0.22 [0.11:0.34] 0.21 [0.09:0.33]
µ¢y 0.27 [0.20:0.33] 0.28 [0.21:0.35] 0.26 [0.19:0.32] 0.27 [0.20:0.34]
½ 0.80 [0.75:0.86] 0.80 [0.75:0.85] 0.81 [0.75:0.86] 0.81 [0.76:0.86]
½a 0.91 [0.87:0.95] 0.91 [0.87:0.95] 0.91 [0.86:0.94] 0.90 [0.87:0.94]
½¼t 0.86 [0.72:0.99] 0.84 [0.69:0.99] 0.87 [0.72:0.99] 0.86 [0.72:0.99]
½C 0.75 [0.58:0.92] 0.81 [0.69:0.96] 0.76 [0.61:0.93] 0.80 [0.67:0.94]
½g 0.95 [0.92:0.99] 0.95 [0.92:0.99] 0.95 [0.92:0.99] 0.95 [0.92:0.99]
½L 0.83 [0.65:0.99] 0.82 [0.65:0.99] 0.86 [0.70:0.99] 0.84 [0.66:0.99]
½I 0.95 [0.91:0.99] 0.96 [0.91:0.99] 0.95 [0.91:0.99] 0.96 [0.93:0.99]
½P 0.86 [0.78:0.94] 0.86 [0.78:0.94] 0.85 [0.77:0.94] 0.85 [0.78:0.94]
sd(²a) 0.35 [0.30:0.39] 0.35 [0.30:0.39] 0.35 [0.30:0.39] 0.35 [0.30:0.39]
sd(²¼t) 0.07 [0.03:0.11] 0.07 [0.03:0.11] 0.07 [0.03:0.12] 0.08 [0.03:0.12]
sd(²C) 2.11 [1.46:2.74] 2.02 [1.36:2.68] 1.96 [1.40:2.49] 1.85 [1.29:2.42]
sd(²g) 1.49 [1.30:1.67] 1.49 [1.30:1.67] 1.47 [1.29:1.66] 1.49 [1.30:1.67]
sd(²L) 1.97 [1.09:2.82] 2.05 [1.07:3.05] 1.96 [1.10:2.73] 2.02 [1.11:2.85]
sd(²I) 0.46 [0.26:0.67] 0.48 [0.27:0.69] 0.41 [0.22:0.60] 0.42 [0.23:0.61]
sd(²r) 0.17 [0.13:0.22] 0.16 [0.09:0.22] 0.16 [0.12:0.21] 0.15 [0.09:0.21]
sd(²Q) 8.59 [4.92:12.45] 8.45 [4.64:13.40] 9.59 [5.01:13.84] 9.48 [5.22:13.76]
sd(²P) 0.07 [0.05:0.09] 0.07 [0.06:0.09] 0.07 [0.05:0.09] 0.07 [0.05:0.09]
sd(²W) 0.31 [0.27:0.35] 0.31 [0.27:0.35] 0.31 [0.27:0.35] 0.31 [0.27:0.35]
Price contract
length} 4.76 4.76 4.76 4.76
LL -457.85 -458.29 -457.61 -458.15
Prob. 0.27 0.18 0.35 0.20
} Price contract length is de¯ned as 1
1¡»P .
34Figure 1: Kleinbergen statistic values for ®c






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Parameter pro¯les for b

























































































Figure 6: Estimated Posterior Impulse Responses to an Interest Rate Shock
39